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“Once upon a time, I . . .
dreamt I was a butterfly. . . 
Soon I awaked, and
there I was, veritably 
myself again. 
Now I do not know 
whether I was 





whether I am 
now a butterfly,
 dreaming 
I am a man.” 
– ZHUANGZI
CHINESE PHILOSOPHER C. 369–286 BC
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In recent years, governments 
from the state of Delaware to the 
Emirate of Dubai have created 
institutions specially designed 
to adjudicate transnational com-
mercial disputes. These institutions 
are hybrids between courts and arbi-
tration, or “arbitral courts.”1 Arbitral 
courts seek to adapt the most popu-
lar features of arbitral tribunals and 
courts in order to accommodate the 
growing challenges of such cases.
Arbitral courts mimic arbitration’s 
traditional features to some degree. 
They have internationally well- 
regarded judges who may also work 
as arbitrators. They claim the neu-
trality, the expertise, and sometimes 
the privacy and confidentiality of 
international arbitration. Unlike arbi-
tration, however, they bind third 
parties, develop transnational law, and 
wield the power of the state. 
There is much to applaud about the 
innovation of arbitral courts. But it 
is important to consider what limits 
should cabin this innovation. Arbitral 
courts unsettle the traditional dis-
tinctions between public and private 
adjudication, and this blurring has 
significant consequences not only for 
understanding the state of the evolv-
ing international judicial system, of 
which U.S. courts have historically 
been an important part, but also for the 
future of legitimacy and transparency 
in dispute resolution around the world. 
Arbitral courts often claim legit-
imacy on grounds that combine 
arbitrators’ and courts’ claims to legit-
imacy. The legitimacy of arbitration 
mostly flows from parties’ consent 
to the arrangement, whereas courts’ 
legitimacy, at least those courts situ-
ated within democracies, derives more 
broadly from social compacts and cus-
toms, including from the democratic 
legitimacy of the state.  
Standing at the crossroads of public 
and private adjudication, however, arbi-
tral courts could abuse their position 
by exercising jurisdiction in contexts 
beyond the scope of what gives them 
legitimacy (e.g., parties’ consent) or by 
closing off public access. There is a sig-
nificant risk that they will do both of 
these things. Like arbitration centers’ 
rules, arbitral courts’ rules tend to be 
flexible. The courts often have substan-
tial discretion over issues like whether 
to join third parties who have not con-
sented to jurisdiction and whether to 
grant parties’ requests to keep the pro-
ceedings and decisions confidential, 
which tends to result in keeping pro-
ceedings secret. Exercising exorbitant 
jurisdiction and proceeding in secret, 
however, could undermine an arbitral 
court’s reputation for evenhandedness, 
its perceived legitimacy, and its poten-
tial to develop transnational law.  
In light of these risks, I offer two 
suggestions for arbitral courts look-
ing to build their own legitimacy and 
to contribute to improvements in judi-
cial institutional design. First, arbitral 
courts should restrict their jurisdiction 
in light of their hybridized source of 
legitimacy that draws on their resem-
blance to both a court and an arbitral 
tribunal. Second, arbitral courts should 
prioritize the public nature of proceed-
ings and decisions and not defer to 
parties’ requests for confidentiality. 
WHAT ARE ARBITRAL COURTS?
Arbitral courts are at the vanguard 
of international commercial dispute 
resolution. They are domestic institu-
tions designed to hear cases involving 
actors or controversies that cross bor-
ders. As such, they are an important 
addition to the “international judicial 
system.”2 They represent an important 
trend in transnational and commercial 
litigation that should be watched care-
fully, and that hold potential lessons in 
institutional design relevant to courts 
everywhere.
Arbitral courts are domestic courts 
that have the following arbitration- 
like characteristics: they (1) allow party 
autonomy over procedures, (2) pro-
ceed in English, (3) permit parties to 
opt into confidentiality, and (4) exer-
cise jurisdiction based on consent, 
often without further connections 
to the locality. They often (5) employ 
foreign judges, (6) have judges sit in 
three-judge panels, (7) offer opportu-
nities for foreign lawyers to appear 
without local counsel, (8) allow parties 
to opt out of the right to appeal, and (9) 
are willing to enforce parties’ selec-
tion of non-state law to govern their 
dispute. Some of these traits are com-
mon to all arbitral courts, and some 
are typical but not necessarily found 
in each example of an arbitral court. 
Regardless of the precise collection of 
arbitration-like characteristics, arbi-
tral courts reveal a trend that extends 
beyond recognized ways in which 
courts, even commercial courts, have 
Arbitral courts unsettle 
the traditional distinctions 
between public and private 
adjudication, and this blurring 
has significant consequences 
not only for understanding 
the state of the evolving 
international judicial system, 
of which U.S. courts have 
historically been an important 
part, but also for the future of 
legitimacy and transparency 
in dispute resolution around 
the world.
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been catering to private parties and 
their disputes, mimicking arbitration, 
and, as we shall see, neglecting their 
roles as public institutions.
Using the term arbitral courts recog-
nizes that these entities are domestic 
courts. They are not international courts 
like, for example, the International 
Court of Justice. Individual states3 cre-
ate and fund them (at least as a formal 
matter). Nor are they actually private 
arbitral tribunals. They render bind-
ing decisions enforceable by the power 
of the state. They can issue subpoenas 
and interim relief. They can join or bind 
non-consenting third parties. Under 
common law traditions, they can 
declare law and establish precedent.
But arbitral courts nevertheless 
closely resemble arbitration.4 Arbitral 
courts build on the efforts of com-
mercial courts to respond to parties’ 
preferences for speed, flexibility, and 
expertise.5 In a number of ways, proce-
dure in commercial courts has become 
increasingly privatized — through 
managerial judging, court-annexed 
arbitration, and increased party con-
trol over procedures. Arbitral courts 
take these efforts several steps fur-
ther. Arbitral courts may employ 
foreign judges, allow foreign lawyers 
to appear before them, and permit par-
ties to opt out of appeals. They operate 
in English (even in non-English-speak-
ing countries). They allow parties to 
choose which forum hears the dis-
pute (regardless of the forum state’s 
connection to the dispute), which 
procedures apply, whether the pro-
ceedings or the resulting decision will 
be kept confidential, and what law gov-
erns the dispute, potentially even if 
parties select non-state-created law, 
like general equitable principles, or 
rules articulated by organizations like 
the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 
Delaware provided an early and 
important example of an arbitral court. 
In 2009, Delaware enacted a stat-
ute allowing Chancery Court judges 
to act as arbitrators.6 For controver-
sies involving at least one Delaware 
business entity, no consumers, and 
amounts in dispute over $1 million, the 
parties could agree to have a Chancery 
Court judge arbitrate their dispute. 
The proceedings would be confidential 
and held in the Delaware courthouse 
for a filing fee of $12,000, plus $6,000 
for each additional hearing day. 
Regular Chancery Court procedure and 
evidence rules would apply, but the 
parties could agree to modify them.7 
The judges could grant any remedy 
they “deem[ed] just and equitable and 
within the scope of any applicable 
agreement of the parties.”8 The los-
ing party could appeal the “order of the 
Court of Chancery” to the Delaware 
Supreme Court, but subject to Federal 
Arbitration Act standards of review. 
The arbitration petitions and deci-
sions would be confidential, but once 
appealed they could become part of 
the public record.9 Delaware designed 
the statute, Chief Justice Myron Steele 
explained, “to keep the United States, 
and in particular, Delaware, competi-
tive in international business dispute 
resolution.”10
In 2013, a panel of the Third 
Circuit declared that these “govern-
ment-sponsored arbitrations” violated 
the First Amendment’s right of pub-
lic access to trials because of their 
confidential nature. The Third Circuit 
judges in Delaware Coalition for Open 
Government v. Strine debated whether 
the Delaware statute created a court 
that had some arbitration-like features 
(like confidentiality, optional proce-
dural rules, limited appellate review), 
which would require public access, 
or an arbitral tribunal that had some 
court-like features (Delaware Chancery 
judges, Delaware courthouse), which 
would not. In fractured decisions, two 
of the three judges thought Delaware 
had unconstitutionally created confi-
dential courts.11 Delaware’s courts had 
to be open to the public.12
The Third Circuit thus thwarted 
Delaware’s attempt to create a 
court-arbitration hybrid — what this 
article calls an “arbitral court.”13 
The Third Circuit’s decision reflects 
both conventional civil procedure the-
ory and arbitration theory about the 
dividing line between courts and arbi-
tration. Courts are public, “procedurally 
rigorous,” and state-sponsored; arbi-
tration is private, “faster and cheaper 
but with fewer procedural safe-
guards.”14 Courts’ authority derives 
from the state; their power extends 
as far as the state’s.  Arbitration, by 
contrast, is a “creature of contract.”15 
The parties’ agreement both defines 
and limits arbitral tribunals’ author-
ity. While scholars have recognized 
a convergence of procedures in dif-
ferent fora16 and bemoaned both the 
privatization of court procedure17 and 
the judicialization of arbitration,18 the 
understanding was that courts and 
arbitration stay in their lanes.19 
While the Third Circuit saw 
Delaware’s arbitral court as a bridge 
When courts are not 
transparent about their 
proceedings or decision- 
making, or when courts 
entrust parties with questions 
of confidentiality, they cross 
a line that compromises their 
effectiveness — in dispute 




too far, the idea has had a more posi-
tive reception elsewhere. International 
commercial courts that mimic traits 
from arbitration have been established 
in Dubai (2004), Singapore (2015), and 
the Netherlands (2019).20  In the same 
period, tax havens such as Bermuda, 
the British Virgin Islands, and the 
Cayman Islands, the place of incorpo-
ration for many foreign firms, have 
established new business courts that 
“resemble commercial arbitration.”21 
This article considers Delaware’s 
government-sponsored arbitration 
experiment, some international com-
mercial courts,22 and these offshore 
courts to be “arbitral courts.” 
ARE ARBITRAL COURTS PUBLIC 
OR PRIVATE?
Arbitral courts shift and blur tradi-
tional boundaries between public and 
private adjudication. The lessons from 
arbitral courts are, in part, positive les-
sons about the power of procedural 
innovation and forum shopping, which 
I have explored in previous work.23 
But as institutions at the crossroads 
of public and private adjudication, 
arbitral courts reveal not only the 
possibilities but also the limits of 
experimentation and party autonomy 
over procedure, especially over ques-
tions of confidentiality.
By combining attributes of both liti-
gation and arbitration, as Hiro Aragaki 
has explained, courts like the arbitral 
court in Singapore reject “an either/or 
choice between public and private adju-
dication; instead, they think of dispute 
resolution holistically, all the while bor-
rowing one device from one process 
and glomming it on to another without 
so much as an afterthought.”24 Courts 
and their designers seem to be throw-
ing traditional distinctions to the wind. 
But can arbitral courts coherently 
reject public/private distinctions in 
all senses? While there is a flexibility 
in the distinction between public and 
private adjudication in many respects, 
there are and should be limits. Here I 
focus on two. 
First, there should be consistency 
between a court’s claim to legitimacy 
and its jurisdictional reach. If a court 
claims legitimacy based on the consent 
of the parties before it, then its juris-
diction should be so limited, just as an 
arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction would 
be. That consent should not justify the 
court reaching beyond what would 
otherwise be the limits of its jurisdic-
tion as it applies to parties and disputes 
beyond what the consenting parties 
have agreed to. 
Second, arbitral courts, like all courts, 
are public institutions. When courts 
are not transparent about their pro-
ceedings or decision-making, or when 
courts entrust parties with questions 
of confidentiality, they cross a line that 
compromises their effectiveness — in 
dispute resolution, in law making, and 
beyond. Dispute resolution behind a 
veil of opacity intentionally hides these 
functions from public observation and, 
thus, dispenses with any obligation of 
justification.25 Trust in arbitral courts 
then becomes solely a function of blind 
trust. Transparency, then, contributes 
to the growth of arbitral courts by pro-
moting their legitimacy, effectiveness, 




To attract cases and to ensure their 
decisions are widely enforceable, arbi-
tral courts will need to establish both 
legal and sociological legitimacy.26 
Legitimacy is a complex concept.27 
To function, a court needs the public 
to perceive it as both “playing an appro-
priate role in . . . governance” and 
“making its decisions based on ‘law,’ 
not ‘politics’ or ‘personal preferenc-
es.’”28 Put another way, both courts 
and arbitration need both sociolog-
ical legitimacy and legal legitimacy. 
The sociological legitimacy of a court 
depends on whether the public views 
the court “as worthy of respect and 
obedience.”29 Legal legitimacy is estab-
lished by using accepted interpretive 
methods and fair procedures.30
The central source of international 
commercial arbitration’s sociologi-
cal and legal legitimacy is freedom of 
contract. As discussed below, decision- 
makers (arbitrators) also lend socio-
logical legitimacy because of who they 
are and how they are chosen. The wide 
respect for freedom of contract and 
the structure of arbitration has led to 
an international structure of support 
built by international treaties, national 
courts, and private interests. 
Courts generally have different 
sources of sociological legitimacy 
— including from the state. In democ-
racies, for example, courts have 
democratic legitimacy.31 In non-dem-
ocratic states, courts sometimes lend 
legitimacy to the state as opposed to the 
other way around. That is, “to varying 
degrees, [authoritarian regimes] also 
attempt to make up for questionable 
procedural legitimacy by preserving 
judicial institutions that give the image, 
if not the full effect, of constraints on 
arbitrary rule.”32
Arbitral courts rely both on arbitra-
tion’s sources of legitimacy as well as 
on the authority of the state. That is, 
like arbitration, arbitral courts seem 
both sociologically and legally legiti-
mate in large part because parties have 
chosen to have their disputes adjudi-
cated there.33 
For decades now, it has become com-
monplace that courts can adjudicate 
disputes based on forum selection 
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clauses even if the parties and the 
dispute have no ties to the forum.34 
Parties can consent to jurisdiction in 
courts just like they can in arbitration, 
thereby giving the court or arbitral tri-
bunal jurisdiction over a set of parties 
and a set of disputes that they might 
not otherwise have. 
When they do so, it would seem 
logical that arbitral courts, like arbitra-
tion, would limit their jurisdiction to 
the case that the parties chose to sub-
mit to them. But this is not usually the 
assumption. Ordinarily, once parties 
have consented to a court’s jurisdic-
tion, the court exercises the full force 
of its powers as an arm of the state — 
including the power to issue subpoenas 
and injunctive relief and to consoli-
date cases not subject to the parties’ 
forum agreement. Moreover, unlike 
what typically happens in arbitration, 
the parties’ consent does not limit the 
court’s jurisdiction to the parties who 
have consented to that jurisdiction. 
That is, consent-based court jurisdic-
tion results in cases where ordinary 
courts can issue subpoenas to third 
parties, join third parties, and other-
wise consolidate cases — even when 
there is no other territorial basis, 
beyond the presence of the consent-
ing parties, for the court’s jurisdiction. 
Indeed, part of courts’ attractiveness as 
a forum is that they can bind third par-
ties and adjudicate some kinds of cases 
(like business torts) that might not be 
able to be subject to arbitration.35
This is true for arbitral courts as well, 
even if their only claim to jurisdiction 
is the original parties’ consent. For 
example, the Singapore International 
Commercial Court (SICC), established 
in 2015, is one of the most celebrated 
arbitral courts. Once the SICC has 
jurisdiction over a case because two 
contracting parties consented to have 
the SICC hear their contractual dis-
putes, the court has the full power of 
the state to include in the proceedings 
additional parties who may not have 
consented.36 Indeed, the SICC rules 
grant the court expansive authority to 
join non-consenting parties, including 
the authority to name them as addi-
tional plaintiffs or defendants — even 
if, apart from this joinder, they have 
no other connection to Singapore and 
Singapore would otherwise lack judi-
cial jurisdiction over them.37 Such 
joinder is not typically available in 
arbitration; the arbitral tribunal’s juris-
diction is set — and limited — by the 
scope of the parties’ agreement.
This result in arbitral courts like 
Singapore’s is, at best, awkward (in all 
cases), and at worst, illegitimate (in 
cases where the arbitral court has no 
other basis for exercising jurisdiction 
over the non-consenting third party). 
It is unclear, however, how often this 
extension of jurisdiction happens38 or 
whether the public would know if it 
did occur, in light of arbitral courts’ 
sometimes non-public dockets.
The point, however, is that ques-
tions of jurisdiction over third parties 
test the distinctions between the legit-
imacy of the court acting as a public 
dispute resolution forum on the one 
hand or a private dispute resolution 
forum on the other. Arbitral courts 
suggest that the public/private bound-
ary may be shifting, in international 
commercial disputes, to one defined 
by the line between authority based on 
parties’ consent and authority based 
on state sovereignty. Arbitral courts 
are trying both to straddle that line 
and to circumvent it. State sovereignty 
alone, however, does not establish 
judicial jurisdiction over everyone 
everywhere. Nor does it establish 
judicial legitimacy, especially in states 
that seek to draw legitimacy from the 
strength of their judicial institutions.39 
It is circular to ask the courts’ con-
sent-based legitimacy to support the 
state’s legitimacy as a sovereign, while 
also asking the state’s power to extend 
the arbitral court’s power beyond its 
original source: the parties’ consent. 
This article therefore recommends 
that arbitral courts limit the scope of 
their jurisdiction — particularly with 
respect to questions of expansive 
jurisdiction, like jurisdiction over third 
parties — based on the scope of con-
tract granting them jurisdiction. 
The same limits — and a similar rec-
ommendation — echo in the area of 
enforcement. One of the most often 
cited reasons for choosing arbitration 
over litigation is the easy availability of 
enforcement of arbitral awards around 
the world. But this distinction may be 
eroding. Based on a trio of treaties,40 the 
difference between easy enforceability 
(traditionally associated with arbitral 
awards) and more demanding scrutiny 
(traditionally associated with court 
judgments) may ultimately depend on 
whether the parties have agreed to 
the forum’s jurisdiction — not whether 
that forum was an arbitral tribunal or 
a court. Under this framework, it will 
be consent, or its absence, that distin-
guishes between ready international 
legitimacy and suspicion — not the dif-
ference between an arbitral tribunal 
and a court. If that becomes the norm 
over time, that may further weaken 
distinctions between arbitration and 
It is circular to ask the courts’ 
consent-based legitimacy to 
support the state’s legitimacy 
as a sovereign, while also 
asking the state’s power to 
extend the arbitral court’s 
power beyond its original 
source: the parties’ consent. 
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litigation in transnational disputes and 
governance more generally. 
But as is the case with jurisdiction, 
the scope of consent should limit the 
scope of enforceability. For example, 
if the SICC were to use its authority to 
join non-consenting third parties, over 
whom the court otherwise would not 
have jurisdiction, then foreign courts 
should not enforce the resulting judg-
ment against the third party.41
DECISION-MAKERS’ ROLE IN 
BUILDING LEGITIMACY
In arbitration, the decision-makers 
(arbitrators) also lend sociological 
legitimacy because of who they are 
and how they are chosen. Arbitrators 
appear more neutral because they are 
not state actors and possibly do not 
share a nationality with one of the 
parties, in contrast to judges on tra-
ditional courts. Many arbitrators are 
well-regarded experts in their fields. 
Moreover, they are chosen by the par-
ties, and therefore even the losing 
party has helped constitute the tribu-
nal and may feel like it had an advocate 
during the decision-making process. 
The chair of an arbitration panel — the 
third arbitrator chosen by the par-
ties’ chosen co-arbitrators42 — also has 
legitimacy based on perceived neutral-
ity because of this selection process. 
Arbitral courts rely not only on con-
sent as an arbitration-like basis for 
legitimacy, but also on the personal 
legitimacy of the decision-makers to 
signal the courts’ independence. Thus, 
Singapore, Dubai, and the Caymans have 
hired international judges from the UK 
and elsewhere — to bring with them the 
credentials, trustworthiness, and legiti-
macy that Delaware sought to sell with 
its judges and their excellent reputa-
tions.43 As non-nationals, these foreign 
decision-makers may quell potential 
concerns that these courts will exhibit 
bias in favor of local parties or the local 
government. They may thus enhance 
the perceived legitimacy and indepen-
dence of the new court.44 Relying on 
the legitimacy of foreign experts as 
decision-makers is once again appro-
priated from international arbitration. 
Arbitral courts’ staffing also tries to 
address common challenges to arbitra-
tion’s legitimacy. For example, arbitral 
courts adopt their own ethical rules, 
warding off arbitration’s problem of 
lacking an applicable ethics code.45 
And unlike arbitral tribunals, which 
commonly allow parties to have a role 
in choosing their arbitrators, arbi-
tral courts assign judges to particular 
cases. This practice seems aimed at 
increasing the likelihood of indepen-
dence and objectivity and preventing 
objections that the arbitral court may 
be beholden to the parties before it.
Whether this appropriated legit-
imacy will ultimately be judged as 
credible will depend on how cases play 
out in these courts — something we can 
observe only if arbitral courts commit 
to transparency. Transparency is like-
wise key to knowing whether arbitral 
courts will operate independently. If 
government, government-connected, 
or otherwise high-influence parties 
come before arbitral courts, will the 
courts maintain their neutrality? As 
the expression goes, “only time will 
tell.” But in order for time to tell, the 
record cannot be shrouded in secrecy.
These courts are still new and must 
be watched for evidence. The Dubai 
International Financial Centre (DIFC) 
courts, one of the oldest examples of 
this new wave of arbitral courts, have 
had mixed results. As Matthew Erie 
has documented, DIFC Courts have 
ruled in favor of the government bod-
ies that have appeared before them, 
but they have also ruled against quasi- 
government corporations.46 This exam-
ple yields hope but does not totally 
alleviate skepticism — and there must 
still be transparency in order to moni-
tor arbitral court independence.
PUBLICITY, CONFIDENTIALITY, 
AND PARTY AUTONOMY
The success of arbitral courts’ hybrid 
approach to legitimacy thus will depend 
in large part on how much of the arbitral 
courts’ operations the public can see. 
This is true not only for the publication 
of opinions, but also for the transpar-
ency of process, dockets, access, and 
other dealings.  As the Delaware exper-
iment revealed, keeping confidential 
the working of arbitral courts tends to 
undermine the institutions’ legitimacy. 
Questions of publicity and confidential-
ity are therefore of utmost importance, 
but they may face resistance from 
another signature feature of arbitral 
courts: party autonomy. 
Arbitral courts purport to be public 
institutions. One common characteris-
tic of public courts is that they have a 
consistent set of procedures and rules 
that apply to all who come to them. 
Nevertheless, arbitral courts give par-
ties considerable choice and control 
over procedural and evidentiary rules. 
In many instances, the parties’ inter-
ests will be antagonistic towards one 
another in a way that balances to yield 
normatively acceptable procedural 
rules. For example, the plaintiff might 
want extensive discovery, the defen-
dant might want minimal discovery, 
and in contracting for procedure, they 
might reach a compromise solution. 
On confidentiality decisions, how-
ever, experience teaches that the 
parties’ interests will likely be aligned 
in favor of confidentiality. But public 
access — to courts’ proceedings, rec-
ords, and decisions — would further 
the long-term institutional interest 
of the forum and the law. In regular 
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arbitration, parties are free to agree 
to keep their disputes — including the 
proceedings and resulting decisions — 
confidential and private. Confidentiality 
is not an inherent attribute of inter-
national commercial arbitration, but 
it is an available option.47 And, when 
offered, parties often choose to keep 
their disputes secret. That is gener-
ally appropriate because the parties 
have chosen a private way of settling 
their disputes and that resolution 
applies only to them. Courts, by con-
trast, ordinarily limit opportunities for 
confidentiality of regular proceedings 
and of judicial decisions, and courts 
and scholars alike urge the impor-
tance of “open justice.” This openness 
is important for a number of reasons, 
including that the courts make law not 
just for the litigating parties but also 
for others, they exercise government 
power, and they are publicly funded 
and provide a public good that the pub-
lic should be allowed to monitor to 
prevent corruption and misuse.
Permitting party control over deci-
sions about confidentiality can make 
arbitral courts much closer to private, 
rather than public, institutions. The 
pitfalls of trusting the openness of 
arbitral courts to the parties have been 
demonstrated in the court context, 
such as in the history of the opioid liti-
gation,48 as well as in the international 
commercial arbitration context, where 
calls for more institutional trans-
parency have run up against party 
preferences.49 Control over confiden-
tiality choices is a little like control 
over forum choices — the allocation 
of decision-making authority typically 
decides the outcome.50 
The traditional distinction between 
“private arbitration” and “pub-
lic courts” has long been eroding, 
particularly as courts offer parties 
more autonomy regarding choice of 
forum, choice of law, and discovery. 
But arbitral courts upend the distinc-
tion completely. Judges, who usually 
control decisions about confidential-
ity powered by strong presumptions 
against it, may still be the ultimate 
decision-makers. But arbitral courts 
may yield a trend toward party con-
trol over confidentiality decisions with 
minimal judicial supervision, powered 
by presumptions favoring the parties’ 
preferences. Those preferences are 
likely to favor confidentiality. 
Structurally, arbitral courts may be 
likely to favor pleasing the parties and 
accommodating those preferences. 
Arbitral courts have put themselves in 
this position to cater to their customers 
— i.e., potential parties to international 
disputes. Offering confidentiality is a 
form of “forum selling”51 as a way to 
compete with arbitration to attract par-
ties to select the arbitral court in their 
forum selection clause or otherwise 
choose the arbitral court for disputes. 
The originators of the term “forum 
selling” suggested that the practice was 
problematic when courts were selling 
themselves to plaintiffs who main-
tained unilateral control over forum 
choices, but not when parties mutually 
agreed on a forum in a forum selection 
clause.52 In that latter situation, the 
authors assumed parties would choose 
the best courts, and courts would be 
driven to provide quality proceedings 
that would satisfy both sides. 
But there are times when parties’ 
interests conflict with those of the 
court and the public. Joshua Karton has 
demonstrated that transparency pres-
ents such a conflict in international 
commercial arbitration.53 The insti-
tution needs transparency to sustain 
sociological and legal legitimacy in the 
long run, but it also needs to offer con-
fidentiality to attract parties in the short 
term. In arbitral courts, these compet-
ing needs exist to an arguably even 
greater extent. Arbitral courts are new, 
and therefore need participants. But 
they also need to publicize what they 
are doing to establish themselves. In 
democracies, such open justice is nec-
essary to bolster judicial independence, 
build legitimacy, and allow for public 
oversight. Arbitral courts in non-dem-
ocratic states have an even higher 
burden to demonstrate to the public 
that they are independent and follow 
the law. And ultimately, the world of 
commercial parties who might choose 
to litigate their disputes there will also 
be attracted by the legitimacy offered 
by transparency, and not just the con-
venience provided by secrecy. 
One might wonder whether arbi-
tral courts’ rules about confidentiality 
are or should be constrained by some 
higher order law. While the UK 
Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed 
the principle of “open justice,” it is not 
clear whether and how this rule will 
bind or persuade arbitral courts in 
Singapore, Dubai, or Kazakhstan, even 
if those courts operate under the com-
mon law tradition. The Third Circuit 
held that the Constitution enshrines a 
similar principle, thwarting Delaware’s 
attempt to create a confidential arbi-
tral court. But it probably would have 
On confidentiality decisions, 
however, experience teaches 
that the parties’ interests 
will likely be aligned in 
favor of confidentiality. 
But public access — 
to courts’ proceedings, 
records, and decisions — 
would further the long-term 
institutional interest of the 
forum and the law. 
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been possible for Delaware (or another 
interested state) to circumvent such a 
ruling. A revised statute, for example, 
could make confidentiality available at 
the judge’s discretion, and then set (or 
allow judges to set) a low threshold for 
granting confidentiality requests (per-
haps even not requiring the request to 
be bilateral). Such a setup might have 
satisfied the Third Circuit. It is also pos-
sible that another set of federal judges 
might agree with the dissent rather 
than the majority in Delaware Coalition. 
Regardless of the answer to the con-
stitutional question, the Third Circuit 
was right in its more basic conclusion 
that confidentiality was the central 
problem with the Delaware arbitral 
court from an institutional design per-
spective. Its decision is also supported 
by both the judiciary’s interest in the 
public interest of access and by arbi-
tral courts’ self-interest in supporting 
their budding reputations, legitimacy, 
and power. 
CONCLUSION
Arbitral courts are widely celebrated 
as adopting the “best” of both worlds 
of binding adjudication: arbitration and 
litigation. But arbitral courts bring per-
ils as well as promise. Arbitral courts 
that exercise jurisdiction beyond the 
scope of the parties’ consent could 
compromise their legitimacy and the 
likelihood that their judgments will 
be recognized and enforced by other 
courts. Arbitral court judges have the 
opportunity to be transparent and 
vocal in their neutrality — but will need 
to reject at least some requests for 
confidentiality to build their own rep-
utations as well as the reputations of 
their institutions. Arbitral courts that 
proceed behind the dark veil of confi-
dentiality, often requested by parties, 
could threaten their own legitimacy 
and eventually lead to their untimely 
demise. Liberal granting of parties’ 
requests for confidentiality will com-
promise not only the decisions made 
in particular cases but also arbitral 
courts’ abilities to develop law and 
shape global governance. Arbitral 
courts present a unique potential to 
develop transnational commercial law 
in a way that the confidentiality and 
lack of authority of traditional arbitra-
tion have thus far inhibited. If arbitral 
courts can contain the scope of their 
power within legitimate limits and if 
they are able to resist parties’ prefer-
ences for confidentiality, they may be 
able to achieve their promise. 
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